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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
J. K. PIERCEY, Chief of the Fire
Department of Salt Lake City, a
municipal corporation ·of the State
of Utah,
Plaintiff}

Case No. 7278

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
OF SALT LAKE CITY, and HAROLD FOX,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In our statement of facts, in giving the page of the
record where matter referred to or quoted is found, we
shall use the letter "R'', together with the page number, to indicate the page in the judgment roll, and the
letter "T ", together with the page number, to indicate
the page in the transcrip't of the hearing held before
the Civil Service Commission.
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D.efendant Harold Fox was employed as a member
of the Fire Department of Salt Lake City, November
23, 1943 ( T 205). On August 6, 1948, he submitted to
pl·aintiff, J. K. Piercey, Chief of the Fire Department
of Salt Lake Ci~ty, his written resignation from the Salt
Lake City Fire Department as follows (R 49): "Effective this date, I hereby tender my resignation from the
S·alt Lake City Fire Department." His resignation was
then and there accerpted by the plaintiff (T 59). Having
thus resigned he turned in that same day the equipment
furnished him by Salt Lake City, which was the natural
thing to do after he had resigned (T 24, 147). At no
time thereafter did he report for duty (T 43). On
August 7, 1948, he sought legal advice and, as a result,
his attorney~ Calvin Rawlings, (T 16), prepared a letter
addressed to plaintiff and the Board of City Commissioners stating that "I (F'ox) hereby withdraw my resignation from the Salt Lake City Fire Department and
request that you disregard my letter of resignation
dated August 6, 1948." (R 14). This letter was signed
by Fox and mailed by his attorney's secretary and was
received by plaintiff August 9, 1948 (T 44).
On August 6, 1948, plaintiff ·sent to City Commissioner Romney, Commissioner of the Public Safety Department, a letter addressed to the Commissioner and
the Board of City Commissioners that Fox "had submitted his resignation to become effective .as of August 6,
1948. I respectfully request that his resignation be accepted." (Commissioner's Exhibit "A", R 47). It was
always the practice in the department, and the advice
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the City La\v· De-partment, that the rnan resigns to
the Chief, and that the Chief has the right to accept
resignations. The Chief, however, reports the resignation to the City Commission. Commissioner '·s Exhibit
''A'' was sent to Commissioner Romney as a pait of
this regular procedure (T 75-76) ..
Under date of August 18, 1948, the City Recorder
sent Fox a letter advising him that ''at a meeting of
the Board of Commissioners held August 17, 1948, your
petition No. 846 tendering your resignation from· the
Salt Lake City Fire Department, effective August 6,
1.948, was taken up and filed and I was directed to notify
you that in view of the opinion of the City Attorney, a
copy of which is submitted, the Board of Commissioners
has at this time accepted this resignation." (R 4).

On August 19, 1948, Fox filed with the Civil Service
Commission ~a notice of appeal to the Civil Service Commission reading as follows :
''NOTICE OF APPEAL.
''You will please take notice that I, Harold
Fox, Fireman First Grade, in the Salt Lake City
Fire Department, appeal to this Commission
from the actions of Fire Chief, J. K. Piercey, of
the Salt Lake City Fire Department, and the
Salt Lake City Board of Commissioners in accepting my resignation from the Fire Department of Salt Lake City after said resignation had
been withdrawn and F'ire Chief Piercey and the
Salt Lake City Board . of Commissioners duly
notified of said withdrawal.
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"It is my position in this matter that the actions of Fire Chief Piercey and the Salt Lake
City Board of Commissioners were an attempt
to discharge me from the Salt Lake City Fire
De;partment. ''
Attached to the notice of appeal were a copy of the Recorder's letter above referred to, and a copy of the letter
of the City Attorney dated August 17, 1948, advising
the City Commission that in view of some doubt as to
whether the City Commission or the Chief of the Fire
Department has the right to accept the resignation, it
was his opinion that the City Commission should accept
the resignation of Mr. Fox so as to make it final and
afford Mr. Fnx whatever remedy he might have (R 3).
We wish to emphasize that the notice of appeal is
from the actions of Chief Piercey and the City Commission in accepting Fox's resignation after S'aid resignation was withdrawn and notice of withdrawal given. No
claim is made in the notice of appeal, or in the letter
withdrawing the resignation, that the resignation submitted was void or voidable by reason of any duress
practiced in its !:P·rocurement and hence not binding upon
Mr. Fox. The notice of appeal was not served upon the
plaintiff.
On August 21, 1948, after the notice of appeal had
been filed with the Civil Service Commission, said Commis·sion .served a written notice upon the City Attorney
for Salt Lake City and upon counsel for Fox that on
August 30, 1948, it would hear arguments from respective counsel on the question of the jurisdiction of the
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Civil Service Commission in the matter of said appeal
(R 5). The minutes of the Commission for August 30,
1948, (R 32) show that the Commission heard arguments of counsel upon the question of jurisdiction and
that a memorandum of authorities was to· he submitted
by the City Attorney. The matter was then taken under
advisement. On September 3, 1948, the City Attorney
filed a memorandum of authorities (R 6-12), maintaining the ~position that the Civil Service Commission was
without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
On September 9, 1948, the Civil Service Commission
served notice upon the City Attorney and plaintiff notifying them that the C:ommission did, by resolution dated
September 8, 1948, .assume jurisdiction of the appeal of
Harold Fox from the removal by Chief of the Fire D-epartment Piercey and ordered the Chief within ten days
after service to file with the Civil Service Commission
and serve upon Harold Fox his complaint of removal (R
15). A copy :of the notice ·Of appeal was attached to this
notice. It will be noticed that the assumption of jurisdiction related only to the so-called removal by the Chief
of the Fire Department Piercey of Mr. Fox from the
Fire Department and made no reference whatever to any
action taken by the City Commission in accepting Fox's
resignation. Nor is any mention made by the Civil
Service Commission of any resignation or that it assumed jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the resignation submitted by Mr. Fox.
Chief Piercey responded to said order to the effect
that Fox had never been removed from the Fire DeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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partment except by his own resignation therefrom in
writing, as hereinabove set out, and for that reason the
Chief had no specifications of complaint of removal to
make in said matter. (R 16).
Mr. Fox answered the Chief's response, admitting
the resignation, and for the first time asserted that such
re·signation was a nullity as it was obtained by duress
and threats of blasting Fox in the newspapers with unfavor~able publicity (R 17-A). He further alleged that
he withdrew his resignation !Prior to its acceptance by
the Board of City Commissioners or by any other body
or person authorized to accept it, setting out the letter
of withdrawal hereinbefore quoted. He further asserted
that the action of the City Commission in notifying him
of their acceptance of the void an~d withdrawn resignation in effect was an attempted discharge, and was intended as such.
The Civil Service Commission set the matter for
hearing November 22, 1948, at which time evidence, both
oral and written, was taken. This testimony is contained
in the transcript of testimony filed herein. Before any
evidence was taken at the hearing plaintiff objected to
the proceeding upon the ground that there is no jurisdiction in the Civil Service Commission to hear the appeal. This objection wa.s stated in full. The objection
was overruled by the Commission, (R 1-8) and plaintiff
excepted to such ruling and thereupon the Commission
directed Mr. Fox to proceed with his testimony. At the
conclusion of Fox's evidence, and after he had rested,
!Plaintiff made a motion that the appeal be dismissed
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upon the ground that the Civil Service Cormnission had
no jurisdiction to .entertain the appeal and that the evidence did not show any overreaching as would vitiate
the resignation tendered by Fox. This motion was denied. (R 26).
On December 20, 1948, the Commission made and
entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree
·(R 23-28). We shall not .attempt here to make a statement of the testimony taken at the hearing or of the
findings of fact made by the Commission. Such statement will be made later in connection with our argument
on points involving the testimony and the finding_s of the
Commission.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS
•

The plaintiff, J. K. Piercey, contends:
1. That said Commission has assumed to exercise
the powers of a court of equity to nullify the resignation
of defendant Harold Fox upon the ground of duress,
which powers are not by law or otherwise vested in said
Commissic;n.
2.

That said Commission has assumed jurisdiction

to adjudicate a matter that is not by law vested in said
Commission to adjudicate, namely, whether the resignation submitted by defendant, Harold Fox, as hereinabove shown, was void or voidable or effective as of
the date it was given and accepted by plaintiff.
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3. That said Commission is by law vested with
jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate only appeals
made by a member of the Civil Service from an order
of discharge issued by the head of the department; that
there is no finding or conclusion of law by said Commission that any order of discharge was ever finally
issued or that an ~ppeal was made from an order of
discharge, or that the defendant, Harold Fox, was discharged, and without such finding or conclusion, supported by sufficient evidence, there appears upon the
face of the proceedings a want of jurisdiction in the said
Commission to adjudicate any issue involved in the proceedings attempted to be taken in an appeal to said
Commission. That on the contrary the findings of fact
and conclusions of law made by the Commission show
that the appeal was not taken from an order of discharge, nor was it based upon an order of discharge but
that the said appeal was taken from the action of the
plaintiff in accepting the resignation of defendant, Harold Fox.
4. That in entertaining the appeal of defendant,
H·arold Fox, and in rendering its judgment thereon, the
Civil Service Commission has wholly disregarded and
completely nullified its own rules and regulations duly
adopted by it relating to the matter of discharge and
taking an appeal therefrom and has thereby exceeded
its jurisdiction in entertaining said appeal and in rendering its judgment therein.
5. That the said Civil Service Commission has attempted to determine matters not legally before it for
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consideration, and as to which it had no jurisdiction to
determine, to-"it:
(a)
duress.

Whether the said Harold Fox resigned under

(b) V\Thether the resignation of Harold Fox was
accepted before or after he attempted to withdraw the
same.
(c) "Who is the !PToper officer or body to accept the
resignation of Harold Fox as a member ·of the Fire
Department~

6. That the findings of fact of said Commission
show on their face that there was in f.act no such overreaching perpetrated by Chief J. K. Piercey upon defendant, Harold Fox, as could legally be held to amount
to duress or coercion, or that could or would destroy or
control the free volition of said Harold Fox in submitting his resignation, or that would render his resignation as given involuntary and for that reason legally
void or voidable.
7. That the findings of fact of said Commission
show on their face that the resignation submitted by
Harold Fox was not involuntary and was not induced
or procured by the exercise of coercion or duress practiced upon Harold Fox by plaintiff or any one else.
8.

That said Commission did not have jurisdiction

to entertain and adjudicate said appeal, as the appeal
was not taken within the time prescribed by law.
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9. That the findings of fact of the Civil Service
Commission do not support its conclusions of law or
judgment.
10. That the uncontradicted evidence does not support the findings of fact or the conclusions of law or the
judgment made herein by the Civil Service Commission.
11. That the Civil Service Commission arbitrarily
or capriciously disregarded the uncontradicted evidence
in making its findings of fact, its conclusions of law and
its judgment herein.
12. That the findings of fact and conclusions of the
Civil Service Commission that the resignation of Harold
Fox was not accepted by Chief Piercey until after the
receipt of the letter of withdrawal is wholly unsupported
by and is contrary to the undisputed evidence and is
wholly capricious and arbitrary.
13. That the conclusions of the Civil Service Commission that the letter or notice withdrawing Harold
Fox's resignation voided his resignation is wholly unsupported by and is contrary to the undisputed evidence
and is wholly capricious cand arbitrary, and said conclusion is likewise contrary to law.
14. That the conclusions of law and decree of the
Civil Service Commission herein are based Ufpon wholly
contradictory premises, to-wit, one that the resignation
of the defendant, Harold Fox, was such a resignation
as could be acted upon and accepted but was withdrawn
before acceptance, and the other, that his resignation
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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was procured by duress and coercion and was therefore
void or voidable and never binding upon him and needed
no notice of withdra,Yal to be. repudiated.
ARGUMENT

I.
DID THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HAVE
JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN AND DETER~fiNE THE APPEAL TO IT BY DEFEND·ANT FOX~
A
Under this head we assert, first, that the Civil Service Commission had no right or power to assume jurisdiction of the appeal of Mr. Fox and to render judgment
therein that his resignation be voided and he be restored
to his employment in the Fire Department. This phase
is covered by assignments of error one to five, inclusive.
The Civil Service Commission is a subordinate
tribunal created by statute and can exercise only such
powers as are given it by statute. "It is fundamental
that jurisdiction must affirmatively ~ppear on the face
of the proceedings, and that no presumption will be indulged in favor of it, as is the case of a court of general
jurisdiction.'' 2 McQuillan, Mun. Corps., Section 590,
page 484.
In ·Garvin vs. Chambers, ------ C:al. ______ , 232 P. 696,
the court, speaking of the Civil Service Commission,
says:
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''The defendant board in the instant case is
an inferior board or tribunal of limited jurisdiction exercising judicial functions. Its jurisdiction
is limited to the determination of those questions
which it is authorized to decide under the provisions of the charter of the city of Oakland. In
other words, it has jurisdiction to proceed only
when facts appear in a proceeding before it which
show that it has jurisdiction.
''The jurisdiction of the ·civil service board,
as previously indicated, is special and limited by
the charter of the city of Oakland to the determination of the correctness of the order of discharge of the petitioner. The power of the board
being special and limited, no legal presumptions
or intendments may be indulged to uphold its
order. Petersen v. Civil Service Board ('Cal.
Ap;p.) 227 P. 238. Facts must appear on the face
of the record sufficient to sustain a finding that
the petitioner was guilty as charged, otherwise
the order of the defendant board sustaining the
discharge was in excess of the power conferred
upon the board, without the limits of its :special
jurisdiction, and not in the regular pursuit of its
authority as contemplated by sections 1068 and
1074 of the Code of Civil Procedure.''
The Court further says :
"The fact that the authority of the board had
been invoked by the taking of the appeal would
not deprive the petitioner of the right to attack
the final action of the hoard of transcending its
powers.''
The only provision in the statutes of this state investing the Civil Service Commission with the power to
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exercise judicial functions is Section 15-9-21, U.C.A.

1943. This section reads as follo,vs :
''All persons in the classified civil service
may be removed from office or employment by
the head of the department for misconduct, incompetency or failure to perform his duties or
failure to observe properly the rules of the department, but subject to appeal by the aggrieved
party to the civil service commission. Any person discharged may within five days from the
issuing by the head of the department of the
order discharging him appeal therefrom to the
civil service commission, which shall fully hear
and determine the matter. The discharged person
shall be entitled to appear in person and to have
counsel and a public hearing. The finding and
decision of the civil service commission upon
such hearing shall be certified to the head of the
department from whose order the appeal is taken,
and shall he final, and shall forthwith be enforced
and followed by him.''
It is apparent from the language of this section that
the words ''removed from office or employment,'' in the
first part of the section, are synonymous with the word
''discharged'' used in the rest of the section. This court
in Vette.rli vs. Civil Service Commission, 106 Utah 83,

145 P. 2d 792, said:
''That 'remove from office' and 'discharge'
are synonomous expre·ssions as used in our statute, is clear from a cursory reading thereof. The
power to 'remove from office' conferred upon
the head of a department means not a temporary
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but a permanent removal from office or discharge."
On the question of the limited powers of the Civil
Service Commission, the court has this to say:
''That for infractions of the rules of conduct
the department head might suspend a ~lerson for
fifteen days, as a means of effecting discipline in
his department. That in such sphere of discipline,
~e is in nowise subject to the sup·ervision of the
commission. That in aggravated cases and in
cases where the disciplinary measures given exclusively to the departm·ent head prove inefficacious, the power to discharge is conferred; but
because of the severity of the penalty, as well as
because of the fact that it involves a permanent
severance from the department, thus aff·ecting
the make-Ulp, of the personnel, over whose appointment the commission "is given a limited control,
a right to appeal to the commission is granted to
the discharged officer . or employee. The civil
service commission is made the ultimate authority
to determine whether the discharge should or
should not stand. To this end the commission is
given the authority and duty to 'fully hear and
determine the rna tter.' That is, it is to accord a
full hearing to the appellant and to the department head as to the truth or falsity of the charges
made, and thereupon to d.etermine whether to
affirm or to set aside the order made. We do not
find in our statute any phrase which grants the
same jurisdiction on appeal as is conferred where
the power on appeal is to 'affirm, modify or reverse, '-an expression usually if not universally
employed where such authority is actually conferred. The substitution of suspension for six
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months without pay, in lieu of dismissal, was beyond the povver of the commission.''
In speaking of a 1police officer, "Those status under
the statute is identical with that of a fireman, this court
said in Roe vs. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 57 P. 2d 1128:
'' ""-~ police officer is responsible only to the
head of his department, to whom has been given
the power of appointment and removal from office. R. S. Utah 1933, 15-9-9 and 15-9-21. ''
From the foregoing it is evident, first, that the Civil
Service employee has a right to appeal to the Civil
Service Commission only from an order of discharge
issued by the head of the ~department, the plaintiff Chief
Piercey in this case; and, second, that the Civil Service
Commission can hear and determine only appeals from
an order of discharge. The entire Civil Service statute
is silent on the matter of resignation. It was not intended
that the Civil Service Commission should have a right
to review the reasons which might prompt an employee to resign, as his- resignation is a result of his
own act. The right of appeal is restricted by the very
language of the section above quoted to a review of the
act of the Chief of the department in discharging the
em'PJoyee, to determine whether the discharge should
or should not stand.
The record now before this court shows conclusively
on its face that the Civil Service C·ommission did not
have before it an appeal from an order of discharge,
and further that it did not inquire into or determine the
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merits of a discharge. The notice of appeal itself states
that ''I, Harold Fox, . . . appeal to this Commission
from the actions of Fire Chief J. K. Piercey, . . . and
the Salt Lake City Board of Commissioners in accepting my resignation from the Fire D-epartment ... after
my resignation had been withdrawn'' and notice thereof
duly given (R 1). We ask, where, under the language
of Section 15-9-21, above quoted, is there any basis for
such an appeal or any jurisdiction vested in the Civil
Service Commission to entertain and determine such
appeal~

The next step in these proceedings wa.s taken when
the Civil Service Commission ''assumed'' jurisdiction of
the a1ppeal pursuant to a resolution passed at one of its
meetings, and served notice to that effect upon the
plaintiff and ordered him to file his complaint of removal (R 15), meaning, of course, under the language
of the statute, his reasons for discharging Fox. Not
withstanding the appeal was from the actions of the
Chief and the City Commissioners in accepting Fox's
resignation, the Civil Service Commission attempted to
proceed a.s if there had been a discharge, no doubt to
give eo lor to its ''assumed'' jurisdiction. This is evidenced by the fact that in the notice to the plaintiff that
the Commission had assumed jurisdiction the Commission was careful to s·ay that it assumed jurisdiction of
the appeal of Mr. Fox only from the removal by the
Chief of the Fire Department Piercey and said nothing
at all about the action of the City Commissioners in accepting Fox's resignation, although the notice of ap~eal
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stated it 'Yas taken from that action as well as from the
Chief's action in accepting the resignation. Apparently,
the Civil Service Commission vva.s aware that under the
la"~ the City Commissioners have no po,ver to re1n·ove
a civil service employee, that povver being vested exclusively in the head of the department. So it affirmatively appears that in entertaining the appeal and
assuming jurisdiction the defendant Commission excluded from consideration anything the City Commissioners did, relying solely upon what jplaintiff, as head
of the department, did.
The plaintiff filed a responS'e to the order simply
stating that Fox had not been removed from his employment except by resigning therefrom and so plaintiff
had no specifications of complaint of removal to make
(R 16). Fox answered setting up that his resignation
was ·obtained under duress and had been withdrawn
prior to its acceptance (R 17-A). When the hearing
was held the C·ommission did not call upon !plaintiff to
proceed and show his reasons for removing Fox. Instead,
the Commission declared that the burden was on Fox
to sustain his claim of duress and withdrawal before acceptance and required him to be the first to proceed
(T 8).
In its findings of fact the Civil Service .Commission
does not find that Fox was discharge~d and that the
reasons for discharge were insufficient and hence Fox
was entitled to reinstatement. The Commission finds
that Fox submitted a letter of resignation but such action
was involuntarily given "while he was frightened and
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alarmed by and under the influence of fear, duress, and
coercion caused and created by the statements of J. K.
Piercey concerning the consequences to Fox and resultant publicity which the sai·d· Piercey stated would
accompany the discharge.'' ( R 2·6).
The Commission concludes as a matter of law that
such resignation so given was invalid 'and voidable and
was voided by the letter withdrawing the resignation
(R 27). In its decree the Commission declares that the
letter of resignation dated August 6, 1948, be voided.
Again we ask, under what language of Section 15-9-21,
is the Commission vested with jurisdiction to so proceed
an·d adjudicate matters- involving the adjudication of
pure matters of law properly and inherently v-ested in
courts of equity~
We are not asserting that Fox has no right to be
heard on the question of whether his resignation was
void or voida:ble because it was obtained under duress.
Courts of equity are op.en to give such. hearing. What
we do claim is that the statute does not vest jurisdiction
in the Civil Service Commission to assume or usurp the
powers of a court of equity and render a decision upon
a matter not made cognizable by it under the terms of
the statute and from which decision there would be no
right of appeal, and thus oust the courts of jurisdiction
to pass upon the question. It should be remembered
that Section 15-9-21 makes the de-cision of the Civil Service Commission final and gives no right of appeal.
Simply because a resignation is claimed to have
been procured under duress or misrepresentation or
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other overreaching does not change it into a discharge.
It still remains a resignation even though it may be a
voidable one in a court of equity. It is adn1itted that Fox
was not discharged. The only question before the Commission, and the only question decided by it, was whether
Fox's resignation was binding. It is obvious that the
right to hear an appeal from a discharge, involving the
merits of the discharge, determining whether there has
been such conduct or neglect of duty on the part of the
:fireman to warrant his discharge, does not include the
~power or the right to decide whether the fireman has,
in law and in fact, resigned his office. The latter question does not in any way involve the fireman's conduct,
fitness, or neglect of duty. The question of resignation
can be determined only by applying the law to the facts.
This- is a judicial function not vested in the Civil Service
Commission, composed, as it may very well be, of laymen. In passing on the merits of a discharge the Commission simply considers facts, the facts of misconduct,
fitness-, or failure to discharge the duties of the office
specified by the Chief as his reasons for discharging the
employee.
A resort to the findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and decree of the Civil Service Commission discloses
there is no finding of fact or conclusion of law or other
adjudication that any order of discharge was finally
issued, or that the appeal was from an order of discharge, or that Fox was .discharged. Without such finding or adjudication, there appears upon the face of the
proceedings a want of jurisdiction in said Commission
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to adjudicate any issue upon said appeal except to determine it did not have jurisdiction. In making the decision it did the defendant Commission had to pass upon
and decide purely legal questions, namely, what constitutes duress in law sufficient to vitiate an act, when is
a resignation accepted, when can it be withdrawn, who
was the proper person or body to accept Fox's resignation. There may be other legal questions involved, but
the foregoing are sufficient to show to what extent the
defendant Commission assumed judicial powers to entertain and determine the appeal to it. Certainly the statute did not contemplate investing a group of laymen with
the right or responsibility to adjudicate such juridical
questions.
The Civil Service Commission, by its own rules, and
of which the Commission said it would take judicial
notice, (R 2-3, 188) has given a construction to its
powers on appeal at variance with its assumption of
jurisdiction in the instant case. Rule 4-6 provides:
''Any employee under civil service discharged
by the appointing power of the department wherein emrployed may within five days from the issuing by the appointing power of the order of discharge appeal therefrom to the Civil Service
Commission.''
Rule 4-7
be s·erved in
by leaving it
and posting
4-8 provides

provides that the order of discharge must
a prescribed manner, by personal service,
at the usual place of residence, or by mail
on the department's bulletin board. Rule
that the order of discharge ''shall have
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issued and be complete .as to start the time running from
which an appeal can be taken to the civil service com~
mission as follo,vs:'' from date of personal service of
the order of discharge, or date it is left at the employee's
residence or at the expiration of ten days from the date
it is mailed and posted. Rule 4-9 prescribes that the
order of discharge must he in writing, properly dated
on the stationery of the department issuing the same,
addressed to the person discharged, and must advise him
that he is discharged from the service and state the effective date of discharge and must be signed by the appointing power of the department issuing the same. Rule
4-11 tprovides- that a return of service of the order of
discharge must be endorsed on the order and the same
transmitted to the secretary of the Civil Service Commission. Rule 4-12 provides that the person discharged
may, by giving notice of appeal, appeal from the order
of discharge to the Civil Service Commission f.or a hearing within five days from its issuance. Rule 4-13 prescribes that notice of appeal must be in writing and
must be signed by the person discharged and must state
in the body that the person appealing wppeals from the
order of discharge of the Chief and the notice of appeal
must have attached thereto the order of discharge or a
copy thereof.
Not one of these rules was complied with in the
appeal to the Commission in the instant case. No order
of discharge was made and consequently no service of
an order of discharge appears in the record; the notice
of appeal does not state that the wppeal is taken from
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an order of discharge ; and fi~ally no copy of the order
of discharge is attached to the notice of appeal. If these
rules are binding and mandatory upon the person appealing,· then there is an entire failure to comply therewith in this case. If these rules mean anything, then no
appeal to the defendant Commission was ever legally consummated for there was a compliance with none of them.
The fact that no coiD.pliance could be made because of
the lack of a discharge only emphasizes the point that
there was no right of appeal in the first place and no
jurisdiction in the defendant Commission to entertain
an appeal in the second place.
We have made a diligent search of the authorities
but have not been able to find any case where an appeal
was taken from an acceptance of a resignation. We do
not have, therefore, the benefit of legal precedent to
assist the court in this case. However, this language
from State vs. City of Brazil, ____ Ind. ____ , 73 N. E. 2d
485, is pertinent:
''When city firemen and policemen elect to
terminate their contracts, sometimes called resigning, and so advise the responsible head of
the city government, their contracts of employment are .at an end. They could not be compelled
to work and their rights under the tenure act
could be waived. They could voluntarily quit
their employment at any time for any reason
satisfactory to them. After doing so they could
not claim any benefits under the tenure act. The
tenure act was not passed for the benefit of those
who quit their jobs but for those who are wrongfully dismissed.''
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B

If the actions of Chief Piercey, in connection with
the submission by Fox of his resignation, were the legal
equivalent of ·.a discharge, then there was a lack of
jurisdiction in the Civil Service Commission to act upon
said ap·peal as the same was not taken in time. (Assignment of error 8). Everything that plaintiff did was
done on August 6, 1948. Fox's resignation was submitted that day, and by its terms was effective that day;
the resignation was accepted by plaintiff that day and
Fox turned in his City equipment that day and never
thereafter reported for work, making a complete severance of his employment; and on that day plaintiff transmitted the resignation to his City Commissioner. Under
the law the power of removal is vested exclusively in
the head of the department. The City Commission could
do nothing to effect a removal or discharge. The fact
that it too acted upon the resignation could not in any
way add to or detract from the severance of employment
already accomplished by ~laintiff in accepting the resignation or by plaintiff in removing Fox from his employment if what plaintiff did was in law· a removal. The
most that can be said of the action of the City Commission is that it was an approval of what had already
been done.
The severance of employment, whether deemed a
discharge or resignation, took place August 6, 1948.
Under hoth the statute and the Civil Service Rules above
referred to, Fox had five days thereafter in which to
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appeal, if what was done that day be deemed a discharge.
He did not file his appeal until August 19, 1948, thirteen
days later, and thereby lost his right to ap,peal.
Later in the brief we shall cite authorities to show
that the person _having the power to appoint is the
proper person to accept the resignation. But to show
that the action of the City Commission in accepting Fox's
resignation, under the suggestion of the City Attorney,
contained in his letter, copy of which is .attached to the
notice of appeal (R 3), can be of no assistance to Fox,
we refer to the case of Shackett V'S. Town of Isla;nd, 146
Ky. 798, 143 S. W. 369, Ann. Cas. 1913 C. 602, where it
was held that a resignation not tendered to one having
power to appoint the resigning officer's successor is a
nullity, the court saying:
''In our opinion the Board of Trustees had
no power or authority to accept the resignation
of members of the Board, so all the acts of the
board in accepting resignations and filling vacancies may be treated as a nullity.''
The letter of resignation submitted by Fox, defendant's Exhibit "B", (T 237), was addressed to plaintiff
alone. Immediately upon its presentation to plaintiff it
was accepted and Mr. Fox himself turned in his City
owned equipment, left his station and never thereafter
presented himself for duty. Since the City Qommission,
as such, had no power to discharge Fox, anything it did
tending to have that effect was a nullity and a right of
appeal from such action would not lie. The right of
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appeal under Section 15-9-21 is only from an order of
discharge issued by the head of the department, as the
head of the dep~artment is the person 'vho has the right
to discharge. Even though it should be held that what
Mr. Piercey did was tantamount to a discharge, we submit, therefore, that the appeal was not timely made and
the Civil Service Commission had no jurisdiction to act
upon it except to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
II.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCL,USIONS
OF LAW MADE BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIO·N SHOW ON THEIR FACE THAT NO DURESS, SUCH AS WOULD VITIATE FOX'S RESIGNATION, WAS PRACTICED UPON HIM BY PLAINTIFF. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 6, 7, AND 9.

A
It is alleged in Fox's answer, as the basis for avoiding his resignation, that Chief Piercey delivered an ultimatum that "if you do not resign from the Fire Department, I'll discharge you and blast you in every
newspaper in Salt Lake. City. I'll give you more publicity than you ever had before or ever wanted." It is
further alleged that the resignation was submitted in
fear of the adverse effect that the threatened bad publicity would have on his family and future employment
opportunities. It is to be noted that the foregoing
charges an avowed activity on the p.art of the Chief to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26

personally see that Fox was blasted and given unfavorable publicity in the newspapers.
The findings of fact, however, do not find any such
threatened activity on the part of the Chief or anyone
else. All that is found is that at a -hearing before the
Chief and the Board of Chief Officers, Fox ''was informed that unless he tendered his resignation from the
Salt Lake City Fire Department he would he discharged;
that a discharge would be accompanied by extremely
detrimental publicity and would seriously and detrimentally affect his opportunities for future employment.'' There is no finding whatever that -charges would
be made against Fox if he refused to resign or the
nature of any charges that might be made or that plaintiff would himself do anything to bring about detrimental publicity or do anything himself to effect Fox's
opvortunities for future employment. The most that
can be said of the findings is that the reference to had
publicity and adverse employment opportunities was
merely an opinion of the plaintiff, given as his judgment
of what would result from a discharge.
It is then found that the resignation was involuntarily given while Fox "was frightened and alarmed by
and under the influence of fea:r;, duress, and coercion
caused and created by the statements of J. K. Piercey
concerning the consequences to Fox and resultant publicity which the said Piercey stated would accompany a
disharge. '' Here is an express finding contrary to the
charge of Fox's answer that the Chief himself would
blast him in every newspaper in Salt Lake City. In the
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absence of any threatened action by Piercey relative to
influencing unfavorable 1publicity, whatever publicity
"~ould result "\Yould depend entirely upon what the newspapers chose to print. Fox was in as good position a.s
the Chief, or perhaps better, to guess what the newspapers would do. Certainly he could not assume that
they would print falsehoods or would take a position
adverse and detrimental to his interests. There could
be, therefore, no compulsion or duress arise out of a
mere statement by Piercey that detrimental publicity
would result from a discharge, a mere matter of opinion only. And yet the finding of the Commission is that
it was the statement of the Chief that unfavorable publicity would accompany the discharge that rendered the
resignation involuntary. Appare·ntly the statement that
he would be discharged did not produce the duress for
the Commission finds it was the statements concerning
the bad publicity that was the duress producing element.
We submit that that element so found is wholly insufficient to sustain the conclusion of law and decree that
the resignation was procurred by duress and was voidable for that reason.
B

The findings of the Commission themselves contradict the conclusion and judgment that the resignation
was procurred by duress. It is specifically. found that
Fox ruppeared before the Chief and the Board of Chief
Officers at 11 :00 A. M. and was there informed that unless he resigned he would be discharged and that detriSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mental publicity would result. Then it is found that Fox
nevertheless refused to resign. This specifically negatives any idea that Fox's will was overpowered by what
was there said.
Then it is found that a letter of discharge was prepared and at 1:30 P. M. it was delivered to Fox in plaintiff's office. So it appears at that time Fox was willing
to submit to a discharge and would so submit rather
than resign. The order of discharge had been issued and
delivered and so far as both plaintiff and Fox were concerned that ended the matter. A few minutes later Fox,
apparently, changed his mind as the Commission found
that he came back .and returned the letter of discharge,
which return was accepted by ~~laintiff, and Fox signed
the letter of resignation. We submit these findings not
only do not sustain, but are contradictory to, the conclusion of the Commission that the resignation ''was
involuntarily given while he was frightened and alarmed
hy and under the influence of fear, duress, and coercion
caused and created by the statements of J. K. Piercey"
made at the meeting at 11:00 A. M.

III.
THE UNCONTRADI~CTED EVID·ENCE DOES
NOT SUPPORT THE FINDINGS O·F FACT OR CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OR THE JUDGMENT. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 10 AND 11.
Concerning what was said in the office of Chief
Piercey at 11 :00 A. M. August 6, 1948, Fox testified
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(T 12) as follo,vs : Chief Piercey said ''you are through
so far as the Fire Department is concerned. I have
asked you to resign. Why don't you resign~'' Fox replied, ''I am not going to resign.'' Since the Civil Service Commission made no finding that the Chief threatened to blast Fox in every newspaper in Salt Lake City
and make it so miserable for Fox he wouldn't get a joh,
we assume the Commission did not believe this part of
Fox's testimony so that part is here omitted. Piercey
asked Chiefs White and Ward if they did not think it
better for Fox to resign and they both said, ''Yes I do.''
Then the Chief said: ''I don't know what's going to
become of you. You've got to work somewhere, but you
aren't going to work in this Fire Department.'' Fox
replied : ''Well, I am not going to resign. ' ' Piercey
said: ''All right, you he back in my office at 1 :30.''
When he returned Chief Piercey had Assistant Chief
Ward hand him a letter of discharge, which stated he
was discharged for misconduct. Fox said, ''Well, is this
all~'' Plaintiff said ''That's all.'' Fox then shook hands
with Assistant Chiefs White and Ward saying it- had
been nice working with them and "if that's all, I will
go." (T 13, 14). He then had been served with the order
of discharge. He couldn't, therefore, he frightened then
by any threat of discharge. That it was not fear over
the thre~at of discharge that caused him to resign is
further evidenced by the following testimony: He was
asked what he was worried about. He answered: "I
figured if he (Chief Piercey) carried out his threats why
it would be just like he said-it would be difficult for
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me to find work. I figured the only thing to do was to
resign.'' After making up his mind to resign he returned and asked Chief Piercey if it was too late to resign. Piercey said he did not know but he would try his
best. The letter of resignation was prepared by the secretary and was signed by Fox. Fox was asked again
what was the impelling consideration that caused him
to sign the resignation. He replied : ' 'Well, knowing
Chief Piercey was an influential high official I knew he
would he very instrumental in my obtaining employment
anywhere else. I was quite scared and quite worried,
and I signed it because I did not want him to carry out
his threats, for fear of my family going to go without."
When asked what threiats, he answered: ''When he said
he would make it so miserable, smear me and make it so
miserable it would be impossible for me to find a job.''
(T 15).
We repeat the Commission in its findings of fact
did not find that Chief Piercey threatened to smear Fox
so he couldn't get a job. The Commission simply found
that at the hearing before Chief Piercey and the Board
of Chief Officers, Fox was informed ''that a discharge
would be accompanied by extremely detrimental publicity :and would seriously and detrimentally affect his ~p
portunities for future employment.'' There is a total
absence in such finding of any threat by Chief Piercey
that he, the Chief, would see to it personally that Fox
was smeared so he couldn't get a job and according to
Fox himself it was only what Chief Piercey personally
threatened to do that caused Fox worry.
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Since the Commission studiQusly refrained from
making any finding that the Chief threatened to smear
Fox, it must have not believed that 1part of Fox's testimony as it was in ·direct conflict with the testimony of
Chief Piercey and the four assistant chiefs who composed the Board of Chief Officers.
Chief Piercey, when asked whether he made the
threats testified to by Fox, answered: ''That is absolutely untrue. That was never said, he would be blaste·d
in the newspaper. It was never said it would he so
iniserable he couldn't get :work.'' ( T 37).
Assistant Chief Thompson was asked if anything
was said about blasting Fox in the newspaper, and he
answered: ''Never once was there any mention of a
newspaper other than that in the event of a discharge
Harold mentioned he would fight the discharge, and in
event of a discharge in a Civil Service trial, all the information that came out of the trial would be public
property and be detrimental to his character. That is
the only thing that was mentioned. Nothing mentioned
about newsprup·ers at all. There was nothing said about
making it tough for him. It was mentioned that the
Chief and Chief Officers did not want to make it disagreeable for him to find other employment, and if he
elected to resign when anybody called up for references,
so far as the department records are concerned, he had
resigned from the Fire D·epartment. '' ( T 85, 86).
Assistant Chief Smith was asked: "Was there anything said by the Chief if he (Fox) did not resign he
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(Piercey) would blast him in the newspapers~" he
answered: ''Absolutely no.'' Q. ''Was there anything
said about making it miserable for him if he stayed on~''
A. "No, sir."
Assistant Chief White testified as follows: Q. "Was
there anything said by the Chief about blasting him in
the newspapers~'' A. ''No, absolutely not.'' Q. ''Was
there anything said by the Chief about making it miserable for him if he did stay around~'' A. ''It was just
the opposite. '' ( T 132).
Assistant Chief Ward's testimony was as follows:
Q. ''Did you hear Chief Piercey say anything about
blasting Mr. Fox in the newspapers~" A. "No, I did
not.'' Q. ''Did you hear Chief Piercey say anything
about making it miserable for him if he did not resign~"
A. '' Nu, I did not.''
Instead of there being any threat of blasting in
newspapers and smearing Fox so he could not get a job,
all that was said by Chief Piercey was to point out that,
if Fox were discharged and he resisted such action, a
hearing would he held at which the Chief would have to
prove the charges against him by calling in witnesses,
and that that procedure would result in publicity; also,
if inquiry vvere made by prospective employers of Fox,
the facts concerning his discharge might have to be explained and that would be unfavorable. (T 30, 35, 37,
39). This testimony is corroborated by Assistant Chiefs
Thompson (T 85, 86), Smith (T 114), White (T 132),
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mony, already referred to, it 'vas not the threat of discharge and its attendant consequences relative to ipublicity or future employment that impelled him to resign,
it was the personal malignant interest which Fox claims
Chief Piercey threatened he would take to see that Fox
was blasted in the ne"'spapers and his chances for future
employment impaired that impelled Fox to resign. But
the Commission did not find the existence of such impelling facts. There is no evidence, therefore, to sustain
the finding that Fox's resignation was given involuntarily while under the influence of duress and coercion.

IV
WAS FOX'S RESIGNATIO·N LE·GALLY EFFECTIVE~ ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 12, 13, and 14.
The first question is, who was the proper person to
accept the resignation~ Under our statutes, Section 159-9 U.C.A. 1943, the Chief of the Fire Department is the
only person vested with the right to appoint and to fill
vacancies. Under Section 15-9-17 the Civil Service Commission shall certify the name of those eligible for appointment to "the appointing power." No one will contend that the "appointing power", to whom such certification is made, is anyone other than the Chief of the
Fire Department, Mr. Piercey in this case. Section 159-21 provides for removal from office by the "head of
the department" who, it must be conceded, is the same
person, the appointing power.
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In Tooele ~County vs . De La Mare,, 90 Utah 46, 59 P.
2nd 1155, the rule is stated as follows:

''The law is well settled, in the absence of
statutory provisions to the contrary, that when
the authority to fill a vacancy is, by law, vested
in a particular commission or officer, such commission or officer is the proper authority 'to a~c2pt
the resignation from such officer.''
As stated in Rockingham County vs. Luten Bridge
Company, 35 Fed. 2nd 301:
"It is well established law that, in the .absence. of express statutory enactment, the authority to accept the resignation of a public officer
rests with the power to appoint a successor to
fill the vacancy. The right to accept a resignation
is said to be incidental to the power of appoint-·
ment. 1 Dillon on Mun. Corp. 3d Ed., Sec. 413.
''The mere filing of the resignation with clerk
of the superior court did not of itself vacate the
office of Pruitt. It was necessary that his resignation he accepted. But, after its acceptance, he
had no power to withdraw it.''
Fox submitted his resignation to Chief Piercey, the
prop·er officer to accept it. We have already shown that
the Chief accepted the resignation the day it was given
and that Fox severed.his employment that day. We have
already shown, also, thatthe City Commission could not,
by its action, assume jurisdiction which it otherwise did
not have to act upon or accept the resignation. It had
no power to a;ppoint or to fill vacancies.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
It is elementary that ~'after acceptance of a resignation effective immediately, one has no power to withdraw it.'' 43 Am. J ur. 25, Public Officers, Section 170.
The rule is stated in 46 C. J. page 980, Section 135
as follows: ''An unconditional resignation which has
been made to the authority entitled to receive it cannot
be withdrawn.'' Since Fox's resignation was accepted by
the Chief and complete on August 6, 1948, he could not
withdraw it thereafter, as he attempted to do in his
letter of August 7, 1948, which was not received hy the
Chief until August 9, 1948.
The next question is whether Fox's resignation was.
voidable because of duress. The duress found by the
Commission is that Fox was informed that unless he
tendered his resignation from the Salt Lake City Fire
Department he would be discharged; that a discharge
would be accompanied by extremely detrimental publicity
and would ser_iously and detrimentally effect his opportunities for future employment; that the letter of resignation was involuntarily given by Fox while he was
frightened and alarmed by and under the influence of
fear, duress, and coercion caused and created by the
statements of J. K. Piercey concerning the consequences
to Fox and resultant rpublicity which the said Piercey
stated would accompany a discharge.
We submit that this finding does not sustain the
conclusion of duress. That a resignation could be .suggested and advised as an alternative to preferring
charges, where there was no threat and the officer was.
not obliged to sign the resignation, and that a resignation
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under such conditions would be upheld was decided in the
case of Reople ex rel Wallace: vs. Diehl, 63 N.Y. S. 367,
affirmed in 60 N. E. 1118. In Stat·e vs. Ness, 139 Ohio St.
309, 39 N. E. 2nd 849, the rule of the Civil Service Commission provided that '' accept~ance by an appointing
officer of the resignation of a person discharged before
final action by the Civil Service Commission will be considered a withdrawal of the charges and the ·separation
of the employee thus resigning shall be entered as a
resignation and the proceedings shall be dismissed without judgment.'' It was held in that case that a resignation submitted by a police officer while charges were
pending against him was not null and void -qnder this
rule. This clearly shows that resigning as an alternative
to standing trial upon charges for dismissal does not
necessarily imply or involve duress. Certainly it is not
to be supposed that the Civil Service Commission would
make a rule permitting something to be done which would
involve duress as a matter of law.

Kramer vs. Boar.(]) of Police Commissioners, 39 Cal.
App. 396, 179 P. 21'6. In this case plaintiff, a member of
the police department, was given a three months' leave
of absence to go into business as a means of cutting down
the cost of the police department being assured that the
leave could be extended for one year. He purchased a
stock of merchandise and engaged in business. Within
three months he was ordered to return to duty. U1pon his
requesting additional time he was informed that he must
either report for duty or resign. He protested this order
but presented his resignation which was accepted. He
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brought a suit for reinstatement claiming- that his resignation was not Yoluntary but was induced by duress and
coercion. The court holds that the resignation was not
induced by duress or coercion but was voluntary saying:
''In order for the action of the board of police
commissioners in presenting to the plaintiff the
alternative of either resigning from or returning
to his post of duty in the police department to
have savored of duress or coercion, such action
must have been unlawful under the long accepted
definitions of these terms.
"In the case of State v. Ladeen, 104 Minn. 252,
116 N. W. 486, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1058, which involved a resignation from office, it was held that
ihe coercion or duress which would render such
resignation either void or voidable must be such
as would exist where one by the unlawful conduct
of another was induced to resign his office under
circumstances which dep.rived him of his free will.
"Measured by these definitions it must be concluded that the plaintiff's resignation from the
police department was not induced by either
duress or coercion, but that the same was voluntary, and hence, upon its acceptance by the board
of police commissioners, worked a final severance
of the relation of the plaintiff as a police officer
with the police department of the city and county
of San Francisco.''

Board of Education vs. Rose, 147 S.W. 2nd 83, 132
A.L.R. 969. Here the pla1ntiff resigned as a county superintendent of schools pursuant to a comp-romise agreement
between two factions of the board of education whereby
litigation over the right of a member of the board to
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hold office was discontinued and charges filed againot
plaintiff were to be dropped and he was to resign. Plaintiff claimed his resignation was obtained under duress
under the law stated in 46 ·C. J. 980, as follows:
"A resignation signed as an alternative to
having charges made against the signer cannot
be said to be given by the party resigning of his
own free will, and can be repudiated at any time.''
The court first points out that this text is based
entirely upon the case of PeO'lJ!le ex rel O'Connor vs.
Hardy, 224 Ill. App. 198, "in which a conditional resignation was obtained from a Civil Service employee by
threat of a superior officer to file charges :against him
and the resignation was accepted three years after it was
tendered under circumstances which did not justify a discharge of the employee.'' The court held that the facts
of the case before it did not bring it within the rule from
Corpus Juris saying:
''No member of the county board made any
threat of any kind with reference to filing charges
against the appellee or any statement that appellee would he removed as .a result of the hearing
on the charges. ''
It seems that plaintiff was fearful of an adverse
deeision on the charges filed against him and thought
the decision thereon would be against him. The court
points out he could have appealed from an adverse decision, but he chose rather to resign. "No such duress was
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imposed Uipon him such as entitled him to withdraw his
resignation which had been accepted.''

In 132 A.L.R. 975 is a note on the subject of duress
as ground for withdra,ving or avoiding resignation from
public office. Some of the cases above cited are there
cited. The other cases referred to in the note involved
factors of duress which are not present in the instant
case. The case of People ex rel O'Connor vs. Rardy, 224
lll. App. 198, referred to in the case of Board of Education vs. Rose, supra, is referred to in said note. That
case, however, is distinguishable from the instant case as
is pointed out by the court in the case of Board of Eduoation vs. Rose.
In the case of State vs. Ladeen, 104 Minn. 252, 116
N. W. 486, the evidence showed that the officer was
threatened with personal violence and with the filing of
charges of embezzlement against him and that his farm
would be taken from him to cover his shortage unless he
resigned.

In the case of Kidd vs. St~ate Civil Service Commission, 55 P. 2nd 245, the resignation was obtained under
false representations and vromises as to reinstatement,
the court saying that it appears "that appellant's signature to the resignation was obtained by false representations in that he signed the same to protect his civil service standing believing the doctor's statements to be true.''
The other cases cited in the note do not disclose the
facts out of which the duress arose.
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We respectfully submit that the Civil Service Commission was without jurisdiction to entertain and hear
the appeal of Mr. Fox. We further submit that the
findings of fact and c~nclusions of law show on their
face that there was not such duress or coercion asserted
upon Mr. Fox as would .avoid his resignation. We further
assert that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain such a
conclusion. We maintain, therefore, that the judgment of
the Civil Service Commission ordering the restoration
of Mr. Fox to his employment with the Salt Lake City
Fire Department should be set aside and vacated.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CHRISTENSEN,

City Attorney
HOMER HOLMGREN,
A. P. KESLER,

Assistants
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